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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JOHN MARK HEATON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050508-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from sentences on two convictions: illegal possession or use of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004), and use or possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(l) (West 2004), in the Second District Judicial 
Court, Davis County, the Honorable Darwin C. Hansen presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court comply with its statutory duty to resolve inaccuracies in the 
presentence investigation report when it considered each complaint and made the 
requested alterations? 
"' Whether the trial court properly complied with a legal duty to resolve on the record 
the accuracy of contested information in sentencing reports is a question of law that we 
review for correctness."5 State v. Johnson, 2006 UT App 3,16,129 P.3d 282 (quoting State 
v. Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, \ 23, 94 P.3d 295). 
II. Did defendant's trial counsel render ineffective assistance when he persuaded 
the trial court to resolve all of his objections to the presentence investigation report in 
his favor, which, nevertheless, would not have made a difference in sentencing? 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal presents 
a question of law. State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6, 89 P.3d 162 (citing State v. Bryant, 965 
P.2d 539, 542 (Utah CtApp.1998)). However, "appellate review of counsel's performance 
[is] highly deferential." Bryant, 965 P.2d at 542. 
STATUTES 
The following statutes are attached at addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-1 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession or use of a controlled substance, a third 
degree felony; possession or use of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor; and 
interference with an arresting officer, a class B misdemeanor. R22-23. A jury convicted 
defendant on the first two counts, but acquitted him on the third. R91, 93. The court later 
referred defendant to Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) for a presentence investigation 
report (PSI). R99. Defendant alleged numerous inaccuracies in the PSI during the 
sentencing hearing, and the court found all defendant's proposed corrections "necessary and 
appropriate to give accuracy to the report." R141:49-57,66. Nevertheless, the court denied 
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defendant's request for probation and sentenced him to an indeterminate term of zero to five 
years in prison on his felony conviction, and 180 days in jail on his misdemeanor conviction, 
to run concurrently. R112,106-08,141:67-68. At defendant's request, the court ordered that 
defendant serve his jail sentence in prison. Rl 12. The court also recommended defendant's 
acceptance and participation in the prison's Drug Board Program. Id. Defendant timely 
appealed. Rl 13-14. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant found in possession of drugs. 
On October 26, 2003, the police responded to a report that defendant may have 
attempted suicide at his mother's residence. R132 (PSI). They entered the residence, forced 
their way into the bathroom, and took defendant into custody. Id. Inside the bathroom, the 
officers found a syringe containing blood. Id. Defendant's blood later tested positive for 
cocaine and opiates. Id. 
Sentencing 
The court ordered a PSI after defendant's conviction. R99, 141:40. In the PSI, 
AP&P recommended defendant's incarceration, citing to "significant problem areas[:] 
criminal history, companions, leisure/recreation, drug abuse issues, and employment." Rl 3 0. 
The court indicated that it had reviewed the report. Rl41:47. During the sentencing hearing, 
however, defendant brought several alleged inaccuracies in the PSI to the court's attention. 
See R141:149-57. By defense counsel's calculation, if all corrections were taken into 
account, defendant's score on the PSI's offense matrix would have dropped from level four 
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to level two. R141:56. The prosecutor had no objection to the corrections. R141:57. 
Defense counsel then requested that defendant be granted probation, and re-enrolled in 
RS AT, a drug treatment program. Rl 41:59-60. Defendant admitted to the court that he was 
unable to stop using drugs, despite having served thirteen years in prison and having 
previously participated in RS AT. Rl 41:60-61. Defendant requested a rehabilitation program 
in which he would be required to provide urine samples three times a week. R141:62. 
The State stood by its recommendation of prison time. The prosecutor explained that 
he was not relying on the PSI matrix in making his recommendation, and noted defendant's 
poor history with drug treatment programs and multiple probation violations. R141:63-64. 
He explained that the prison operates a drug board program, similar to the program defense 
counsel requested for defendant, which provided frequent testing and treatment. R141:64. 
The prosecutor suggested a recommendation that defendant participate in the drug board 
program during his commitment. R141:6 5. 
The court found that defendant's corrections to the PSI were "necessary and 
appropriate to give accuracy to the report." R141:66. However, it found that those changes, 
in light of the circumstances, were not relevant to defendant's sentence. Id. Specifically, the 
court noted defendant's failure to benefit from programs such as RSAT in the past, and 
explained that "sometimes you get to the point where you have to protect the public by 
having a person in a custodial facility where there is sufficient security." Id. The court 
sentenced defendant to prison for an indefinite term of zero to five years on his felony 
conviction, to run concurrently with the sentence on his misdemeanor conviction. Rl 12, 
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106-08, 141:67-68. The court recommended defendant's participation in the drug board 
program, and reminded defendant that "[he would] be able to participate but [he had] to 
decide whether [he would] or whether [he would not]." R141:68. Finally, the court 
encouraged defendant to take advantage of the resources offered to him "so that [he could] 
change [his] life." Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court fulfilled its statutory duty by determining 
the accuracy and relevancy of defendant's objections to the presentence investigation report 
on the record. Moreover, defendant has failed to show that his trial counsel was ineffective. 
Counsel objected to numerous alleged inaccuracies, omissions, and misconstructions in the 
presentence investigation report, all of which the court resolved in his favor. Additionally 
and notwithstanding the favorable resolution of his objections, defendant has failed to show 
that a reasonable and conscientious decision-maker would have sentenced him differently, 
in view of his extensive criminal record. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court failed "to duly consider [defendant's] objections 
[to the PSI] and specifically resolve them on the record" and failed to "comply with its legal 
duty to properly resolve presentence investigation report objections." Aplt. Br. at 9. In 
support of his argument, defendant cites State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 973 P.2d 404, and its 
progeny. See also State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62,6 P.3d 113; State v. Maroney, 2004 UT App 
206, 94 P.3d 295. In those cases, the trial courts sentenced the defendants without 
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determining the relevance and accuracy of alleged inaccuracies in the PSI reports, as 
mandated by UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (West 2004). Defendant asks this Court to 
set aside his sentence and remand to the district court for re-sentencing. Aplt Br. at 15-16. 
The trial court, however, complied with its duty in this case. Moreover, it accepted as true 
all of defendant's alleged inaccuracies. The trial court, after taking all of these corrections 
into account, exercised its discretion reasonably by rejecting defendant's request for 
probation. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMPLIED WITH ITS STATUTORY DUTY TO 
DETERMINE THE ACCURACY AND RELEVANCE OF DEFENDANT'S 
CORRECTIONS TO THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT. 
When a defendant informs the court of an inaccuracy in his presentence investigation 
report, the trial court has a statutory duty to address and resolve the alleged inaccuracy on 
the record. See UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18-1 (6)(a)(West 2004). The Utah Supreme Court has 
interpreted this statute as requiring sentencing courts to make "an express determination of 
the parties' objections to the presentence report on the record." State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 
\ 45 n.6, 973 P.2d 404. Failure to do so is error. Id. Furthermore, the trial court commits 
error when it fails to make specific findings on the record, even when it is "clearly aware of 
the issues and the alternative characterization urged by defendant." State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 
62,f 15,6 P.3d 1133. 
The trial court complied with its duty in this case. Defendant raised several objections 
to the PSI, including the date of a conviction, his relationship with the mother of his children, 
the reduction of a felony conviction to a misdemeanor, and his mother's name being listed 
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as a collateral contact. See R141:49-56.! The court actively participated in this process, 
repeatedly asking clarifying questions. See e.g., R141:50 (asking for name of employer), 
R141:54 (asking for details of defendant's neurological disease), R141:54 (clarifying 
defendant's relationship to his daughters). The court had clearly reviewed the PSI prior to 
sentencing. See R141:47 (stating that it had reviewed PSI), R141:49 (explaining that court 
had already recognized and made defendant's first correction). The record indicates that the 
court was taking notes throughout the colloquy with defense counsel. See R141:52 (defense 
counsel asks court, "[A]m I going too fast? You're writing and I'm talking."), R141:53 
(asking defense counsel for a minute to catch up), R14T.54 (asking for spelling of disease). 
After so engaging with defendant and defense counsel, the court stated: 
1
 In all, defendant raised fifteen objections to the PSI: (1) the report contained an 
incorrect conviction date, R141:49; (2) defendant had not been "known to associate with 
individuals involved in criminal activity and/or illegal drug use," id; (3) the report was 
missing employment information, R141:50-51; (4) the report stated that he had provided 
no written statement, but he was not given the opportunity to draft one, R141:51-52; (5) 
the report incorrectly represented that his July 17, 1986 conviction was for felony drug 
possession with fraud, when it was actually misdemeanor attempted possession, R141:48, 
52; (6) his July 19, 1989 convictions should not have included driving on a suspended 
license (DOS), id; (7) report failed to note that defendant was physically and mentally 
abused by his mother throughout childhood, R141:53; (8) the report represented that he 
had a "long term relationship" with his children's mother, when he did not, id.; (9) the 
report failed to note that defendant suffers from Meniere's Disease, R141:54; (10) 
defendant had been accepted to a vocational rehabilitation program before his trial, 
R141:55; (11) defendant had not been given opportunities to participate in other drug 
rehabilitation programs, other than RSAT, R141:55; (12) defendant's mother should not 
be included on his list of collateral contacts, R14T.55-56; (13) corrections made by 
defendant to his felony history would result in a decrease of two points on the criminal 
history matrix, R141:56; (14) corrections of defendant's misdemeanor record would 
decrease the matrix by another point, id; (15) defendant had never absconded from any 
program or supervision. R141:56-57. 
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With regard to the corrections that you've made to the presentence report, 
I find those corrections necessary and appropriate to give accuracy to the report 
but nevertheless I don't find the nature of the corrections to have any significant 
impact upon the Court's sentence that the Court is going to impose. 
Rl 41:66. Thus, these changes, although necessary, did not convince the court that defendant 
should be granted probation. Id. Instead, it followed the recommendation of the State and 
AP&P, noting defendant's recurring drug problems and the drug treatment programs 
available in prison. Id. 
Defendant contends that the trial court, by actively listening to defendant's corrections 
and granting all of defendant's alteration requests, failed "to duly consider the inaccuracies" 
and "did not comply with its duty to properly resolve [defendant's] objections." Aplt. Br. at 
12. Defendant offers no suggestion of how much treatment the court should have given each 
alleged inaccuracy in order to "duly consider" it. However, he appears to misunderstand the 
scope of section 77-18-l(6)(a). The code "does not require the judge to rewrite the 
presentence investigation report, [but] require[s] the judge to make a determination of the 
relevance and accuracy of the report on the record." Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, U 44 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). The court did so in this case. Although it did not 
"rewrite" the PSI, or repeat each alleged inaccuracy, it actively considered them and affirmed 
each of defendant's corrections. 
This case is distinguishable from Jaeger and its progeny because the trial courts in 
those cases either neglected or refused to address the proposed corrections. See Jaeger, 1999 
UT 1, Tflj 42-45 (holding that court failed to resolve objections when it stated, "[T]he 
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presentence report is the way it is . . . . As far as my amending or changing the presentence 
report, I will not make a decision either way."); State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, fflf 34-35, 999 
P.2d 7 (noting that court did not address the objections); Veteto, 2000 UT 62, f 15 (holding 
that trial court erred by failing to address two specific objections, even though aware of the 
issues); Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, f 27 (holding that court failed to make requested 
findings on the record). 
Moreover, under those cases, a defendant is prejudiced only when alleged errors are 
not resolved—when the court fails "to make a determination of relevance and accuracy on 
the record." Section 77-18-l(6)(a). Here, in contradistinction, the court fulfilled its first 
statutory duty—to determine the accuracy of the report—by finding that defendant's 
corrections to the PSI were "necessary and appropriate to give accuracy to the report." 
R141:66. It fulfilled its second obligation—to determine the relevance of the corrected 
report—when it found that "the nature of the corrections [would not] have any significant 
impact upon the Court's sentence." Id. That is all that the law requires. 
II. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT HIS COUNSEL WAS 
INEFFECTIVE IN PRESENTING HIS OBJECTIONS TO THE PRESENTENCE 
INVESTIGATION REPORT. 
Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was constitutionally deficient because he 
"failed to specifically request that the sentencing court exercise its fact finding function to 
resolve the inaccuracies in the [PSI.]" Aplt. Br. at 13-15. He further asserts that "[b]ut for 
counsel's unprofessional failure . . . the result at sentencing would have been different." 
Aplt. Br. at 15. The claim is meritless. 
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"To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, [a defendant] must meet both prongs 
of the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)." State v. Wright, 2004 UT App 102, f 9, 90 
P.3d 644. "To prevail, a defendant must show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment and, second, that counsel's performance 
prejudiced the defendant." Id. (citations omitted). 
A. Defendant fails to show his trial counsel performed deficiently—contrary 
to defendant's claim, counsel fully presented the claimed inaccuracies to 
the trial court with the object of having them corrected in his favor. 
Defendant's claim that his trial counsel performed deficiently by not asking the trial 
court to resolve alleged inaccuracies in the PSI is defeated by any common sense reading of 
the record. Here, the court asked counsel, "I need to know what Mr. Heaton believes is err 
[sic] in the report." R141:48. Counsel then alleged, at length, fifteen objections to the 
PSI—inaccuracies, omissions, and misconstructions—and offered appropriate corrections. 
R141:49-57. Among those objections was counsel's reconstruction of the criminal history 
assessment (Form 1). R141:56. Counsel argued that based on his corrections to the PSI—a 
misdemeanor rather than a felony conviction on July 17, 1986, deletion of July 19, 1989 
misdemeanor conviction for driving on suspension, and his never having absconded from any 
program or supervision—defendant's criminal history dropped from "IV" to "II," changing 
the matrix recommendation from intermediate sanctions to regular probation. R139 (PSI); 
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141:56-57.2 At the conclusion of counsel's enumeration and after hearing counsel's and the 
prosecutor's sentencing recommendations, the court accepted counsel's resolution of all of 
the claimed inaccuracies, but asserted that it would not significantly affect the court's 
sentencing decision. R141:66. On this record, the court obviously treated counsel's 
presentation as a request to determine the accuracy and relevance of defendant's objections 
to the PSI. 
B. Defendant fails to show he was prejudiced—his argument consists of a single 
sentence, lacking analysis or record citation, and the court, correcting the 
PSI in defendant's favor, sentenced him reasonably and conscientiously. 
Defendant further argues that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to ask the 
court "to utilize its fact finding function" to resolve the alleged inaccuracies. Aplt. Br. at 15. 
The claim is meritless. First, the claim is inadequately briefed. See State v. Thomas, 961 
P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998) ("It is well established that a reviewing court will not address 
arguments that are not adequately briefed."). See also State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, \ 7, 
1 P.3d 1108 (noting inadequacy of appellant's brief which failed to provide "meaningful legal 
analysis" and "merely continued] one or two sentences stating his argument generally . . . 
and then broadly concludefed] that [appellant] is entitled to relief). 
Defendant's assertion that he was prejudiced consists of a single sentence: "Had the 
sentencing court been alerted to its obligation, the court more likely than not would have duly 
2
 In fact, even accepting all of defendant's claimed inaccuracies, as the trial court 
did, a correct construction of the assessment would place defendant in criminal history 
level "III": 4 for two felony convictions; 4 for more than seven misdemeanors; and 3 for 
prior revocations; totaling a score of 11. R139. A criminal history score of 11 would 
have returned defendant to a matrix recommendation of intermediate sanctions. Id. 
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considered the inaccuracies set forth in the presentence investigation report, which, in turn, 
would have allowed it to more fully and accurately consider the matters presented during 
sentencing." Aplt. Br. at 15. The assertion is speculative. See Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 
516, 526 (Utah) (speculation is not sufficient to meet the prejudice component of the 
ineffective assistance of counsel test), cert denied, 513 U.S. 966, 115 S. Ct. 431 (1994). It 
is also unsupported by any citation to the record or any analysis. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 
7. Therefore, the Court should decline to consider it. 
In any event, it is clear that in light of the court's evident resolution of defendant's 
claimed inaccuracies in his favor, defendant has not shown that there would have been a 
difference in the outcome. "In setting forth the prejudice prong in Strickland, the Supreme 
Court held that '[t]he assessment of prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the 
decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards that 
govern the decision '" State v. Wright, 2004 UT App 102, % 20, 90 P.3d 644 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 695, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984)). See also State v. Maroney, 
2004 UT App 206, 94 P.3d 295 (upholding sentence supported by substantial, reliable 
information against plain error challenge notwithstanding remand for correction of some 
alleged inaccuracies in PSI). 
A few of defendant's alterations presented arguably mitigating factors, such as his 
neurological disease, R141:54, his assertion that he does not associate with known criminals, 
R141:49, and the reduction of his 1986 felony offense to a misdemeanor, R141:52. Several 
weighty factors, however, were not altered by defendant. Even taking into account the two 
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changes defendant made to his criminal history, defendant has been convicted of thirteen 
misdemeanors and two felonies. See Rl34-36. Defendant has violated the terms of his 
probation and parole on numerous occasions. See R134 (1989 misdemeanor probation 
revoked), R135 (1990 felony probation revoked, 1993 parole violation, 1994 parole 
violation). Defendant also admitted that he could not stop using drugs outside of state 
custody: "although jail and prison [] does work for a while because it keeps you off the street 
and it keeps you away from drugs [,] once I'm out, I go right back to normal." R141:61. The 
court expressed its concern: "[Yjou're telling me right now that you know how to say no, you 
don't want drugs but if I let you out of jail, then theoretically what you're telling me is next 
week, then you don't know how to say no, you use drugs." R141:62. Defendant later 
opined, "They say if you can get a year sobriety down your belt that it would be easy [to 
quit]." R141:62-63. The court then sentenced defendant to concurrent sentences on both his 
felony and misdemeanor convictions, R141:67, and recommended that he receive drug 
treatment in prison. R141:67-68. Thus, defendant will receive a year without access to 
drugs, and treatment in a drug program. 
In this case, the court weighed mitigating circumstances presented by defendant 
against his criminal history, rehabilitative needs, and previous probation and parole 
violations. The court explained that defendant needed to be placed in state custody to protect 
the public. R141:66. The court complied with statutory limits: it sentenced defendant to an 
indeterminate term of zero to five years in prison, and recommended defendant's placement 
in the drug board program. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203(3) (West 2004). It is evident 
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that the court " reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially appl[ied] the standards that 
govern the decision." Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 695, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068. 
Further, it is irrel evant whether the matrix recommendation, after defendant's 
alterations, technically would have placed him in row two or three. It is well-established that 
"the recommendations of the prosecutor or any other party are not binding upon the court." 
State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1300 (Utah App. 1989) (citation omitted). Even Adult 
Probation and Parole is not bound by the matrix calculation: the PSI indicates that matrices 
"are guidelines only. They do not create any right or expectation on behalf of the offender." 
R139. Moreover, the court would not abuse its discretion if it sentenced defendant without 
the aid of a PSI. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-l(5)(a) ("Prior to the imposition of any 
sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the defendant," obtain a presentence report) 
(emphasis added). Given the wide discretion granted to trial courts at sentencing, the court 
acted reasonably and conscientiously in denying defendant's request for probation. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's sentence should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted May }b, 2006. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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§ 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 3 . Felony conviction—Indeterminate term of imprisonment 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprison-
ment for an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, unless the statute provides 
otherwise, for a term of not less than five years and which may be for life. 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, unless the statute provides 
otherwise, for a term of not less than one year nor more than 15 years. 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, unless the statute provides 
otherwise, for a term not to exceed five years. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-203; Laws 1976, c. 9, § 1; Laws 1977, c. 88, § 1; Laws 
1983, c. 88, § 5; Laws 1995, c. 244, § 2, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 289, § 2, eff. 
May 5, 1997; Laws 2000, c. 214, § 1, eff. March 14, 2000; Laws 2003, c. 148, § 2, eff. 
May 5, 2003. 
§ 77—18—1. Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—Probation— 
Supervision—Presentence investigation—Standards—Confidentiality— 
Terms and conditions—Termination, revocation, modification, or exten-
sion—Hearings—Electronic monitoring 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of 
any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the 
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court 
may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections 
except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private 
organization; or 
§ 77-18-1 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, 
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
department. 
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to 
the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the 
prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. 
Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have 
not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall 
be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an 
additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report 
with the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be 
resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on 
the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investiga-
tion report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be 
waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or 
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present con-
cerning the appropriate senfence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the 
defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may 
require that the defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail 
designated by the department, sifter considering any recommendation by 
the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of 
electronic monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including 
the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest 
in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; 
and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appro-
priate; and 
§77-18-1 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the 
hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and condi-
tions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant 
by the court. 
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a 
earing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the 
robationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a 
finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts assert-
ed to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that 
authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable 
cause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is 
justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be 
served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit 
and an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked, 
modified, or extended. 
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the 
hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be 
represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for 
him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of 
the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecut-
ing attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning 
by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of proba-
tion, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or 
that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
§ 77-18-1 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; 
and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement 
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, 
it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Depart-
ment of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the 
defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of 
the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confine-
ment to the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be 
indigent by the court. 
(£) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this 
section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 2; Laws 1982, c. 9, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 47, 
§ 1; Laws 1983, c. 68, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 85, § 2; Laws 1984, c. 20, § 1; Laws 1985, c. 
212, § 17; Laws 1985, c. 229, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 114, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 226, § 1; 
Laws 1990, c. 134, § 2; Laws 1991, c. 66, § 5; Laws 1991, c. 206, § 6; Laws 1992, c. 
14, § 3; Laws 1993, c. 82, § 7; Laws 1993, c. 220, § 3; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 24; Laws 
1994, c. 198, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 230, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 20, § 146, eff. May 1, 1995; 
Laws 1995, c. 117, § 2, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 184, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 
1995, c. 301, § 3, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 337, § 11, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 
1995, c. 352, § 6, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 79, § 103, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 
1997, c. 390, § 2, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 94, § 10, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 
1999, c. 279, § 8, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 287, § 7, eff May 3, 1999; Laws 
2001, c. 137, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 7, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 
2002, 5th Sp. Sess., c. 8, § 137, eff. Sept. 8, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 290, § 3, eff. May 5, 
2003. 
